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Abstract
In this paper, we study the extent to which any risk measure can lead to superadditive risk
assessments, implying the potential for penalizing portfolio diversification. For this purpose we
introduce the notion of extreme-aggregation risk measures. The extreme-aggregation measure
characterizes the most superadditive behavior of a risk measure, by yielding the worst-possible
diversification ratio across dependence structures. One of the main contributions is demonstrat-
ing that, for a wide range of risk measures, the extreme-aggregation measure corresponds to the
smallest dominating coherent risk measure. In our main result, it is shown that the extreme-
aggregation measure induced by a distortion risk measure is a coherent distortion risk measure. In
the case of convex risk measures, a general robust representation of coherent extreme-aggregation
measures is provided. In particular, the extreme-aggregation measure induced by a convex short-
fall risk measure is a coherent expectile. These results show that, in the presence of dependence
uncertainty, quantification of a coherent risk measure is often necessary, an observation that lends
further support to the use of coherent risk measures in portfolio risk management.
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1 Introduction
Debate on the desirability of alternative sets of properties for risk measures has been raging
since the seminal paper of Artzner et al. (1999) on coherent measures of risk. Key to coherence
is the property of subadditivity, implying that the merging of risky positions should always yield
capital savings. Subadditivity, as well as the alternative notion of convexity, has gained wide ac-
ceptance in the literature; see Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011, Chapter 4) for an extensive treatment.
However, dissenting voices have persisted. For instance, Dhaene et al. (2008) criticize subadditivity
from a regulatory perspective, considering the impact of mergers on shortfall risk. Cont et al. (2010)
argue that empirical estimators of coherent risk measures lack classical robustness properties, while
Kra¨tschmer et al. (2014) introduce a generalized notion of robustness that allows comparisons be-
tween coherent risk measures. A further twist is added by considering the property of elicitability
(Gneiting, 2011) of a risk measure. A risk measure is elicitable if it can be written as the unique
minimizer of a suitable expected loss function; this representation provides a natural statistic for as-
sessing the performance of statistical procedures used to estimate the risk measure. Such discussions
are exemplified by the comparative advantages of the (coherent, non-elicitable, less robust) Expected
Shortfall (ES) and the (non-coherent, elicitable, more robust) Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures; see
Embrechts et al. (2014) and Emmer et al. (2014) for reviews of such arguments. Related debates are
not caged within academia; discussions on a potential transition from VaR to ES in regulation and
risk assessment are sought by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in two recent consulta-
tive documents BCBS (2012, 2013), and by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
in a more recent document IAIS (2014).
In this paper, we focus on subadditivity, the key property which distinguishes coherent risk
measures (such as ES) and non-coherent risk measures (such as VaR). For a risk measure ⇢ : X !
[−1,1] where X is a set of risks (random variables), we consider the diversification ratio (see for
instance Embrechts et al., 2014 and Emmer et al., 2014) for a portfolio X = (X1, . . . , Xn) 2 X
n,
defined as
∆X(⇢) =
⇢(X1 + · · ·+Xn)
⇢(X1) + · · ·+ ⇢(Xn)
,
that is, the ratio of portfolio risk over the sum of the risks of individual positions. Lack of subad-
ditivity makes the value of ∆X(⇢) potentially greater than one, indicating lack of capital savings
from diversification. Considering what the largest possible value of ∆X(⇢) can be, leads to the
fundamental question we attempt to address in this paper: How superadditive can a risk measure
be?
To answer this question, we focus on the properties of law-invariant risk measures themselves,
rather than those of specific portfolios. For that reason, we consider homogeneous portfolios with
identical marginal distributions F of size n and let n vary. We then introduce the law-invariant risk
2
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measure
Γ⇢,n =
1
n
sup{⇢(X1 + · · ·+Xn) : Xi 2 X , Xi ⇠ F, i = 1, . . . , n},
that is, the worst-case value of the aggregate risk, scaled by 1/n, across all homogeneous portfolios
with marginal distribution F . The largest possible value of ∆X(⇢) can be directly obtained from Γ⇢,n.
Subsequently, dependence on the portfolio size is eliminated by defining the extreme-aggregation
measure induced by ⇢ as Γ⇢ = lim supn!1 Γ⇢,n, thus considering worst-case diversification under
extreme portfolio aggregations.
Γ⇢ is itself a risk measure with many properties inherited from ⇢. It provides risk measurement
under the most adverse dependence structure for given marginal distributions, which is of interest
in the study of dependence uncertainty ; see for instance Bernard et al. (2014) and Embrechts et al.
(2015). In applications such as operational risk modeling, the dependence structure between risks
is typically unknown, with very limited empirical evidence to allow for its estimation. When there
is insufficient data to estimate the dependence structure of a portfolio, it is necessary to calculate
the risk measure Γ⇢ to derive an upper bound on the portfolio risk, even when the portfolio is
inhomogeneous (see discussions in Section 3).
We proceed by deriving explicit expressions for the extreme-aggregation measure induced by
common risk measures and find that it is in fact coherent in cases of interest. We start with the class
of distortion risk measures (Yaari, 1987; Wang et al., 1997; Acerbi, 2002), originating from early
study on non-additive measures (Denneberg, 1990, 1994). Distortion risk measures include both
VaR and ES as special cases. The main theorem in this paper shows that the extreme-aggregation
measure induced by a distortion risk measure ⇢ is the smallest coherent distortion risk measure
dominating ⇢. An asymptotic equivalence (in the sense of Embrechts et al., 2014) of distortion
risk measures with their extreme-aggregation measures is established, in the case of inhomogeneous
portfolios.
A further class of interest is that of convex risk measures (studied by Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2002) and Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin (2002) in financial capital requirements and early by Deprez
and Gerber (1985) in insurance pricing). We show that when ⇢ is a convex risk measure, the
corresponding extreme-aggregation measure Γ⇢ is the smallest coherent risk measure dominating ⇢,
and a robust representation of Γ⇢ is thereby provided for ⇢ satisfying the Fatou property. In the
specific case of shortfall risk measures, we show that Γ⇢ is identified with an expectile (Newey and
Powell, 1987), which is the only coherent shortfall risk measure (Weber, 2006), as well as the only
elicitable coherent risk measure (Ziegel, 2014; Delbaen et al., 2015).
In summary, for a wide range of risk measures, Γ⇢ corresponds to the smallest coherent risk
measure dominating ⇢. These results show that, in the presence of dependence uncertainty, the
worst-possible value of a non-coherent risk measure often equals to the value of a coherent risk
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measure on the same portfolio, an observation that lends further support to the use of coherent risk
measures in portfolio risk management.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we list the definitions and notation used
in this paper, and connect the diversification ratio of a portfolio with the notion of an extreme-
aggregation measure. In Section 3, distortion risk measures are considered and the form of the
induced extreme-aggregation measures is obtained. Section 4 deals with the extreme-aggregation
measures of convex risk measures. Brief conclusions are stated in Section 5, while all proofs are
collected in the Appendix.
2 Diversification and extreme-aggregation
2.1 Definitions and notation
Let (Ω,A,P) be an atomless probability space and Lp := Lp(Ω,A,P) be the set of all random
variables in the probability space with finite p-th moment, p 2 [0,1]. A positive (negative) value
of X 2 L0 represents a financial loss (profit).
A risk measure ⇢ : X ! [−1,+1] assigns to every financial loss X 2 X a real number
(or infinity) ⇢(X), where the set X is a convex cone, and L1 ⇢ X ⇢ L0 (⇢ is the non-strict set
inclusion). We always let ⇢(X) 2 R for all X 2 L1 to avoid triviality. We gather here some of
the standard properties often required for risk measures. A risk measure ⇢ may satisfy, for any
X,Y 2 X :
(a) Monotonicity : if X 6 Y P-a.s, then ⇢(X) 6 ⇢(Y ); (b) Cash-invariance: for any m 2 R,
⇢(X−m) = ⇢(X)−m; (c) Positive homogeneity : for any ↵ > 0, ⇢(↵X) = ↵⇢(X); (d) Subadditivity :
⇢(X+Y ) 6 ⇢(X)+⇢(Y ); (e) Convexity : for any λ 2 [0, 1], ⇢(λX+(1−λ)(Y )) 6 λ⇢(X)+(1−λ)⇢(Y );
(f) Zero-normalization: ⇢(0) = 0, (this is implied by (c)); (g) Comonotonic additivity : if X,Y are
comonotonic, then ⇢(X + Y ) = ⇢(X) + ⇢(Y ); (h) Law-invariance: if X and Y have the same
distribution under P, denoted as X
d
= Y , then ⇢(X) = ⇢(Y ).
In the above, we say that X and Y are comonotonic if
(X(!)−X(!0))(Y (!)− Y (!0)) > 0 for a.s. (!, !0) 2 Ω⇥ Ω,
(see for instance Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2011, Definition 4.82).
The properties listed above and many more can be found in different literatures, such as
finance (e.g. capital setting; Artzner et al., 1999, Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2002, Frittelli and Rosazza
Gianin, 2002), insurance (e.g. premium calculation; Bu¨hlmann, 1970, Gerber, 1974, Goovaerts et al.,
1984, Deprez and Gerber, 1985, Wang et al., 1997) and economics (e.g. choice under risk; Yaari, 1987;
Schmeidler, 1989) with mathematical representations corresponding to different sets of properties
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typically provided. Interpretations of risk measure properties vary with applications and a detailed
discussion is not given here.
Following the terminology of Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011), a monetary risk measure satisfies (a,
b), a convex risk measure satisfies (a, b, e), and a coherent risk measure satisfies (a-d) (or equivalently
(a-c, e)). Most commonly studied risk measures also satisfy (h), for practical applications and
statistical tractability.
The risk measure most commonly used in banking and insurance for capital setting purposes
is Value-at-Risk (VaR), defined as
VaRp(X) = inf{x : P(X 6 x) > p}, p 2 (0, 1), X 2 L
0,
which satisfies (a-c, f-h), but not (d) or (e). A coherent alternative to VaR is Expected Shortfall
(ES),
ESp(X) =
1
1− p
Z 1
p
VaRq(X)dq, p 2 [0, 1), X 2 L
0,
satisfying properties (a-h). A convex but not positively homogeneous risk measure frequently en-
countered in the literature is the entropic risk measure (ER)
ERλ(X) =
1
λ
logE[eλX ], λ > 0, X 2 L0, (2.1)
which finds its origins in indifference pricing (Gerber, 1974) and satisfies properties (a, b, e, f, h).
VaR and ES belong to the class of distortion risk measures, while ER is an example of a convex
shortfall risk measure.
For all risk measures discussed in this paper law-invariance (h) is assumed and not explicitly
stated as a property from now on; in the same sense, we assume that if X 2 X and Y
d
= X, then
Y 2 X . We use X ⇠ F to indicate that X 2 X and X has distribution F ; this, implicitly, assumes
that all random variables with distribution F are in the set X of our interest. Throughout the
paper, we denote by XF any random variable with distribution F on R, that is, XF ⇠ F . For any
distribution function F , we denote the generalized inverse function
F−1(t) = inf{x : F (x) > t}, t 2 (0, 1], and F−1(0) = sup{x : F (x) = 0}.
A risk measure may not be well defined on all L0 random variables. Specific constrains on X
relating to families of risk measures are stated when these risk measures are defined in Sections 3
and 4.
2.2 Diversification ratio of a risk measure
For a risk measure ⇢ and a portfolio of risksX = (X1, . . . , Xn) 2 X
n with 0 < ⇢(X1), . . . , ⇢(Xn) <
1 we define the diversification ratio
∆X(⇢) =
⇢(X1 + · · ·+Xn)
⇢(X1) + · · ·+ ⇢(Xn)
. (2.2)
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∆X(⇢) is a measure of portfolio diversification; see the discussions of Embrechts et al. (2014) and
Emmer et al. (2014), as well as the references therein1. When ∆X(⇢) 6 1, a diversification benefit
is indicated, a situation always guaranteed by the subadditivity of ⇢. When ⇢ is not subadditive,
∆X(⇢) > 1 is possible.
For a non-subadditive risk measure ⇢, we are interested in the largest possible values for ∆X(⇢),
characterizing the worst-case diversification scenario. In this paper, we treat ∆X⇢ as a property of
⇢ rather than the diversification characteristic of individual portfolios. For that reason, we consider
homogeneous portfolios, Xi ⇠ F, i = 1, . . . , n. Denote the set of possible portfolio risks with
identical marginal distributions F ,
Sn(F ) = {X1 + · · ·+Xn : Xi ⇠ F, i = 1, . . . , n}, n 2 N.
Assuming (for now) 0 < ⇢(XF ) <1, we define the n-superadditivity ratio, for n 2 N,
∆Fn (⇢) = sup
⇢
⇢(X1 + · · ·+Xn)
⇢(X1) + · · ·+ ⇢(Xn)
: Xi ⇠ F, i = 1, . . . , n
}
=
sup {⇢(S) : S 2 Sn}
n⇢(XF )
. (2.3)
Taking the supremum in ∆Fn (⇢) serves to reflect the question of “how superadditive” the risk measure
⇢ can become. If ⇢ is comonotonic additive or positively homogeneous, then choosing X1 = · · · = Xn
a.s. leads to ⇢(X1+ · · ·+Xn) = ⇢(X1)+ · · ·+ ⇢(Xn); by the supremum in the definition of ∆
F
n (⇢) it
follows that ∆Fn (⇢) > 1. For subadditive risk measures ⇢, it is ∆
F
n (⇢) 6 1. Hence for coherent risk
measures ⇢ (that are subadditive and positive homogeneous), ∆Fn (⇢) = 1.
When ⇢ is not coherent, the calculation of ∆Fn (⇢) is not easy and is known as the Fre´chet
problem; see Embrechts and Puccetti (2006) for a study on ⇢ = VaRp, p 2 (0, 1). Wang et al.
(2013) gave the value of sup {VaRp(S) : S 2 Sn} when F has a tail-decreasing density, leading to the
explicit value of ∆Fn (VaRp). For general risk measures ⇢ or general marginal distributions F , explicit
values of ∆Fn (⇢) are not available. Even in the case of VaR, analytical results are very limited; see
Embrechts et al. (2013) for a numerical method. We are particularly interested in determining the
overall superadditivity ratio supn2N∆
F
n (⇢), quantifying the greatest possible n-superadditivity ratio
across all portfolio sizes n and thus providing an answer to our question of “how superadditive a
risk measure can be”, as well as characterizing worst-case diversification.
For the particular case of VaR it has been shown that
sup
n2N
∆Fn (VaRp) = lim
n!1
∆Fn (VaRp) =
ESp(XF )
VaRp(XF )
, (2.4)
such that the worst diversification of VaR can be characterized via the associated ES. Puccetti and
Ru¨schendorf (2014) showed (2.4) under an assumption of complete mixability; Puccetti et al. (2013)
1For comonotonic additive ρ, the denominator of (2.2) becomes the risk measure of the sum of comonotonic risks
with corresponding marginal distributions; this is typically interpreted as a worst-case dependence scenario (see e.g.
Dhaene et al., 2002, 2012).
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for a strictly positive density; Wang (2014) for a bounded density; finally, Wang and Wang (2015)
for any distribution. In the present paper we consider a much more general version of (2.4).
The assumption 0 < ⇢(XF ) < 1 guarantees that ∆
F
n (⇢) remains easily interpretable and
corresponds to the practical situation that F is the distribution of a loss. However, this is not a
mathematical requirement. One may define the law-invariant risk measure
Γ⇢,n(XF ) :=
1
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Sn(F )}, n 2 N,
that is, the highest possible risk of the homogeneous portfolio X1, . . . , Xn ⇠ F , normalized by 1/n;
in particular Γ⇢,1(XF ) = ⇢(XF ). It is immediate that, whenever well defined, ∆
F
n (⇢) can be written
as ∆Fn (⇢) =
Γ⇢,n(XF )
⇢(XF )
. With this in mind, in the sequel we do not require ⇢(XF ) > 0 and work with
Γ⇢,n(XF ) instead of ∆
F
n (⇢).
2.3 Extreme-aggregation measures
We now discuss the superadditivity and diversification properties of risk measures through a
global version of Γ⇢,n, which does not depend on the portfolio size n. First we consider risk measures
that satisfy comonotonic additivity, positive homogeneity or convexity2, corresponding to most risk
measures encountered in practice. For such risk measures, the limit of Γ⇢,n as n ! 1 corresponds
to the largest possible value of Γ⇢,n among all possible portfolio sizes n. We assume ⇢(XF ) > −1
throughout the rest of the paper to avoid pathological cases without loss of generality.
Proposition 2.1. If the risk measure ⇢ is (i) positively homogeneous or (ii) comonotonic additive
or (iii) convex and zero-normalized, then the following hold:
(a) For all n, k 2 N, it is Γ⇢,n 6 Γ⇢,kn;
(b) lim sup
n!1
Γ⇢,n = sup
n2N
Γ⇢,n. In case of (ii) or (iii), we have that lim
n!1
Γ⇢,n = sup
n2N
Γ⇢,n.
For any risk measure ⇢, the following holds:
(c) For any subadditive risk measure ⇢+ such that ⇢+ > ⇢, it is Γ⇢,n 6 ⇢
+ for all n 2 N.
Motivated by Proposition 2.1(b), we introduce the notion of extreme-aggregation (risk) mea-
sures, which characterizes the worst-case risk measure among all homogeneous portfolios, under
which the risk measure ⇢ is “at its most superadditive”.
2In the presence of monotonicity, it is actually found that comonotonic additivity implies positive homogeneity
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011). However, monotonicity is not required here, allowing for commonly used risk measures,
such as the standard deviation.
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Definition 2.1. The extreme-aggregation measure Γ⇢ induced by a risk measure ⇢ is defined as
Γ⇢ : X ! R [ {−1,1}, Γ⇢(XF ) = lim sup
n!1
⇢
1
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Sn(F )}
}
.
Consider a risk measure that satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, such that Γ⇢(XF ) =
supn2N Γ⇢,n(XF ) holds. Then, by definition, for 0 < ⇢(XF ) <1, it is
sup
n2N
∆Fn (⇢) =
Γ⇢(XF )
⇢(XF )
. (2.5)
Some properties of ⇢ are inherited by Γ⇢, as summarized below.
Lemma 2.2. If a risk measure ⇢ satisfies any of the properties (a-f) in Section 2.1, then Γ⇢ inher-
its the corresponding properties. Moreover, if ⇢ is (i) positively homogeneous or (ii) comonotonic
additive or (iii) convex and zero-normalized, then Γ⇢ > ⇢; if ⇢ is subadditive, then Γ⇢ 6 ⇢.
Considering its relevance to the worst-case superadditivity of a risk measure, the mapping
Γ⇢ : ⇢ 7! Γ⇢ from the set of risk measures to itself is of our primary interest. Distortion risk
measures, which are positively homogeneous and comonotonic additive, are treated in detail in
Section 3; convex risk measures are discussed in Section 4. Explicit constructions of Γ⇢ for those
classes of risk measures are given. In those examples, we observe that in addition to the properties of
⇢, Γ⇢ very often “gains” more desirable properties, such as positive homogeneity and subadditivity.
When Γ⇢ is subadditive, it becomes the smallest subadditive risk measure dominating ⇢.
Corollary 2.3. If ⇢ induces a coherent (subadditive) extreme-aggregation measure, and satisfies
any of the assumptions of Proposition 2.1, then the smallest coherent (subadditive) risk measure
dominating ⇢ exists and is Γ⇢.
Thus, a coherent Γ⇢ provides the closest conservative coherent correction to ⇢. Note that in
general it is not clear whether such a smallest coherent risk measure dominating ⇢ exists. Corollary
2.3 is of independent mathematical interest, not contingent on either the definition of a diversification
ratio or an assumption of portfolio homogeneity.
3 Distortion risk measures
3.1 Preliminaries on distortion risk measures
For the whole of Section 3 we assume that X is the set of random variables in L0 bounded from
below, unless otherwise specified. This serves to avoid possibly undefined values of the risk measure
and, in the present context, corresponds to having bounded gains.
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A distortion risk measure ⇢h : X ! R [ {+1} is defined as
⇢h(XF ) =
Z 1
0
F−1(t)dh(t), (3.1)
where h is an increasing, right-continuous and left-limit function, with h(0) = h(0+) = 0 and
h(1−) = h(1) = 1. Equivalently, h is a distribution function supported in (0, 1)3. We refer to
h as a distortion function and δ := dh/(dt−), the left derivative of h, as a distortion factor if
the derivative exists. As the most popular class of risk measures, distortion risk measures were
introduced in insurance pricing by Wang et al. (1997) (see Deprez and Gerber, 1985; Yaari, 1987
and Denneberg, 1990 for early use of (3.1)) and in banking risk measurement by Acerbi (2002) (who
focuses on the case of convex h) under the name spectral risk measures. Recently, VaR and the mean
are shown to be the only elicitable distortion risk measures in Kou and Peng (2014). Sometimes
(see e.g. Kusuoka, 2001), h is allowed to have probability mass on {0, 1}; for example, h(t) = I{t=1},
t 2 [0, 1] leads to h(X) = ess-sup(X), the essential supremum. In this section, we exclude such
special cases.
The family of distortion risk measures includes commonly used risk measures, such as VaRp and
ESp defined in Section 2.1, with distortion functions h(t) = I{t>p} and h(t) = I{t>p}(t−p)/(1−p) re-
spectively. In addition to those risk measures, we consider Range-Value-at-Risk (RVaR), introduced
in Cont et al. (2010) as a robust alternative to ES. RVaRp,q, p, q 2 [0, 1), q > p is the distortion risk
measure with h(t) = min{I{t>p}(t− p)/(q − p), 1}, leading to
RVaRp,q(XF ) =
1
q − p
Z q
p
VaRr(XF )dr.
Any distortion risk measure ⇢h satisfies properties (a-c, f-h) in Section 2.1. It is shown that a
risk measure satisfies (a, g, h) if and only if it is a distortion risk measure up to a scale; see Yaari
(1987) and Schmeidler (1989). The risk measure ⇢h is subadditive (d) if and only if h is convex (δ
is increasing); this dates back to Yaari (1987, Theorem 2, in the appearance of preserving convex
order). A special role of distortion risk measures follows from the Kusuoka (2001) representation,
showing that each (law-invariant) coherent risk measure on X = L1 can be written as the supremum
over a class of coherent distortion risk measures.
We aim to characterize the extreme-aggregation measures induced by distortion risk measures.
Since distortion risk measures are positively homogeneous, by Proposition 2.1, we have Γ⇢(XF ) =
supn2N Γ⇢,n(XF ). Motivated by the discussion of Section 2.3, we seek the smallest coherent distortion
risk measure ⇢+h such that ⇢
+
h > ⇢h. The existence of ⇢
+
h is guaranteed by the following lemma.
3A distortion risk measure is often defined as ρh(XF ) =
R
R
xdh(F (x)) for h increasing but not necessarily right-
continuous and left-limit. The two definitions are equivalent for all continuous random variables. In this paper we use
(3.1) for its analytical convenience.
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Lemma 3.1. For a given distortion function h, the smallest coherent distortion risk measure ⇢+h
that dominates ⇢h always exists, and is given by
⇢+h (XF ) = ⇢h∗(XF ) =
Z 1
0
F−1(t)dh⇤(t),
where for t 2 [0, 1],
h⇤(t) = sup{g(t) : g : [0, 1]! [0, 1], g 6 h, g is increasing, and convex on [0, 1]}. (3.2)
In what follows, h⇤ is defined by (3.2). For a given function h, finding h⇤ is equivalent to finding
the convex hull of the set {(x, y) 2 [0, 1] ⇥ R+ : h(x) 6 y}. Although an analytical formula for h⇤
may not be available, it can always be computed by approximation (see Section 1.1 in de Berg et
al., 2008). Such h⇤ is referred to as the largest convex minorant of h, and it is the most cost-efficient
path (in the sense of ||h0||2; see Hashorva and Mishura, 2014) from (0, 0) to (1, 1) dominated by h.
Note that ⇢+h (XF ) is not guaranteed to be finite even if ⇢h(XF ) <1.
Proposition 2.1 implies that ⇢h(XF ) 6 Γ⇢h(XF ) 6 ⇢
+
h (XF ) for any distortion function h and
a distribution F . In the following examples it is seen that for the VaR and RVaR risk measures it
actually is Γ⇢h(XF ) = ⇢
+
h (XF ), such that in those cases Γ⇢h is coherent.
Example 3.1 (Value-at-Risk). Let h(t) = I{t>p}, t 2 [0, 1] for p 2 (0, 1), such that ⇢h = VaRp.
Then h⇤(t) = I{t>p}(t − p)/(1 − p), t 2 [0, 1], implying ⇢
+
h = ESp. We have that ΓVaRp = ESp
Wang and Wang (see 2015, Corollary 3.7). Hence ΓVaRp is identified with the smallest dominating
coherent distortion risk measure.
Example 3.2 (Range-Value-at-Risk). Let δ, the distortion factor corresponding to h, be a step
function
δ(t) =
8>><
>>:
0 t 6 p,
a p < t 6 q,
b q < t 6 1,
where a > b > 0 and such that h(1) =
R 1
0 δ(t)dt = 1. We can check that h
⇤(t) = I{t>p}(x−p)/(1−p),
t 2 [0, 1], such that ⇢+h = ESp. To prove that Γ⇢h = ESp, observe that h
⇤(t) 6 h(t) 6 I{t>p} and
hence ESp > ⇢h > VaRp. It follows that ΓESp > Γ⇢h > ΓVaRp which leads to Γ⇢h = ESp by Example
3.1. In particular, by choosing b = 0 and thus ⇢h = RVaRp,q, we have that for p, q 2 (0, 1) and
q > p, ΓRVaRp,q = ESp.
3.2 Extreme-aggregation measures induced by distortion risk measures
Examples 3.1 and 3.2 suggest that for some classes of distortion risk measures the smallest
dominating coherent risk measure is again a distortion risk measure and is identical to the extreme-
aggregation risk measure. As the main result of this section, it is now shown that the same is true
for all distortion risk measures.
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Theorem 3.2. The extreme-aggregation measure induced by any distortion risk measure ⇢h is the
smallest coherent risk measure dominating ⇢h, and is given by Γ⇢h = ⇢
+
h .
Theorem 3.2 shows that ⇢+h characterizes the most superadditive behavior of ⇢h, by providing a
sharp upper bound for the n-superadditivity ratios in (2.3). Furthermore, all distortion risk measures
induce coherent extreme-aggregation measures which belong to the same class of distortion risk
measures. This is a non-trivial conclusion, since the infimum over a set of coherent (resp. distortion)
risk measures is not necessarily a coherent (resp. distortion) risk measure in general.
A different interpretation of Theorem 3.2 arises in the context of dependence uncertainty. Recall
that one of the stated reasons for introducing non-coherent distortion risk measures is statistical
robustness (Cont et al., 2010). If the choice of a non-coherent distortion risk measure involves a
trade-off between subadditivity and statistical robustness, the benefits of such a trade-off fade in
a portfolio context. Since in the context of dependence uncertainty the calculation of a coherent
risk measure becomes necessary, comparisons of robustness among coherent risk measures, as those
provided by Kra¨tschmer et al. (2014), are relevant.
The “coherent correction” to the risk measure induced by moving from h to h⇤ entails the
smallest possible reduction in robustness. Example 3.3 illustrates the derivation of such a risk
measure, while Example 3.4 deals with the problem of best-case (dual) diversification scenarios.
Example 3.3 (Truncation of convex distortions). Let h be a convex distortion function, representing
a decision maker’s preferences. The decision maker attempts to “robustify” the coherent risk measure
⇢h, by introducing for some q close to 1 the distortion function
g(t) =
8<
:h(t), t 2 [0, q)1, t 2 [q, 1],
leading to the risk measure
⇢g(XF ) =
Z q
0
VaRt(XF )dh(t) + (1− h(q))VaRq(XF ).
Thus, percentiles with confidence levels beyond q are ignored and the corresponding weight is placed
on VaRq(XF ).
Now, in the presence of a homogeneous portfolio and dependence uncertainty, risk may be
quantified by Γ⇢g = ⇢
+
g = ⇢g∗ . By the convexity of h it follows that
g⇤(t) =
8<
:h(t), t 2 [0, q)h(q) + (t− q)1−h(q)1−q , t 2 [q, 1],
leading to the risk measure
⇢+g (XF ) =
Z q
0
VaRt(XF )dh(t) + (1− h(q))ESq(XF ).
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Thus, the extreme-aggregation risk measure resembles the original ⇢h, with the difference that per-
centiles with confidence levels beyond q receive a constant weight, leading to an ES-like quantification
of extreme risk.
Example 3.4 (Dual bound and best-case scenarios). Let −1 < F−1(0) 6 F−1(1) < 1 and, for
simplicity, both F and h be continuous. The relation ⇢h(XF ) = −⇢h¯(−XF ) holds, where h¯(t) =
1− h(1− t) is the conjugate distortion of h. Let F˜ be the distribution of −XF . It follows that the
best-case diversification (least superadditive) scenario can be quantified by
inf
n2N
⇢
1
n
inf
S2Sn(F )
⇢h(S)
}
= − sup
n2N
(
1
n
sup
S˜2Sn(F˜ )
⇢h¯(S˜)
)
= −Γ⇢h¯(XF˜ ) = −⇢h¯∗(XF˜ ) = ⇢h∗(XF ),
where h⇤ is the conjugate distortion of h¯
⇤ and, by symmetry, is the smallest concave distortion
dominating h. This argument generalizes the known best-case VaR bounds; see Embrechts et al.
(2014) for a relevant discussion.
As an example, let ⇢h = RVaRp,q, such that h(t) = min{I{t>p}(t− p)/(q − p), 1}, implying
h¯(t) = min
⇢
I{t>1−q}
t− (1− q)
q − p
, 1
}
, h¯⇤(t) = I{t>1−q}
t− (1− q)
q
, h⇤(t) = min
⇢
I{t6q}
t
q
, 1
}
.
Hence the best-case dependence scenario is characterized by the superadditive risk measure
inf
n2N
⇢
1
n
inf
S2Sn(F )
⇢h(S)
}
=
1
q
Z q
0
VaRt(XF )dt,
sometimes referred to as the Left-Tail-VaR.
Remark 3.1. Theorem 3.2 can be easily extended to generalized distortion risk measures, defined as
⇢GA := sup
h2A
⇢h, (3.3)
whereA is a set of distortion functions. The extreme-aggregation measure induced by any generalized
distortion risk measure ⇢GA is the smallest coherent risk measure dominating ⇢
G
A, and is given by
Γ⇢GA
(XF ) = sup
n2N
1
n
sup
⇢
sup
h2A
⇢h(S) : S 2 Sn(F )
}
= sup
n2N
sup
S2Sn(F )
sup
h2A
⇢
1
n
⇢h(S)
}
= sup
h2A
sup
n2N
sup
S2Sn(F )
⇢
1
n
⇢h(S)
}
= sup
h2A
⇢+h (XF ).
Note that (3.3) includes all law-invariant coherent risk measures with the Fatou property (see
Kusuoka, 2001; Delbaen, 2012).
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3.3 Asymptotic equivalence between worst-case risk measures
Theorems 3.2 and Remark 3.1 imply an asymptotic equivalence between a non-coherent risk
measure and its coherent counterpart, under the worst-case scenario of dependence uncertainty.
Here we extend the discussion to an inhomogeneous portfolio. For a sequence of distributions
F = {Fi, i 2 N}, we denote
Sn(F) := {X1 + · · ·+Xn : Xi ⇠ Fi, i = 1, . . . , n}.
The quantity supS2Sn(F) ⇢
G
A(S) is the worst-case risk measure ⇢
G
A under dependence uncertainty.
We establish the asymptotic equivalence for generalized distortion risk measures in the following
theorem, based on results in Theorem 3.2 and Remark 3.1.
Theorem 3.3. Let A be a finite set of distortion functions. Assume that there are only finitely
many different distributions in the sequence {Fi, i 2 N}, and 0 < ⇢
G+
A (XFi) < 1 for each i 2 N.
Then, as n!1,
supS2Sn(F) ⇢
G
A(S)
supS2Sn(F) ⇢
G+
A (S)
! 1. (3.4)
From the perspective of risk management, Theorem 3.3 indicates that when assessing capital
conservatively under dependence uncertainty, using ⇢GA and using ⇢
G+
A would give roughly the same
capital estimates. This suggests that in situations where information on the dependence structure
is unavailable, a conservative regulation principle would take the information of the coherent risk
measure ⇢G+A into account for quantifying risk aggregation. This ratio is close to 1 even for small
numbers n; see Embrechts et al. (2014) for numerics in the case of VaR and ES.
Remark 3.2. The equivalence (3.4) for VaR and ES was studied under various different conditions
on the marginal distributions; see Embrechts et al. (2014, 2015) and the references therein.
In the case of infinitely many elements in A, a uniform convergence for (n, h) 2 N⇥A is required
in the proof of the above theorem for the same equivalence to hold.
4 Convex risk measures
4.1 Extreme-aggregation measures induced by convex risk measures
Convex risk measures, satisfying properties (a), (b), and (e) in Section 2.1, are discussed in
detail by Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011, Chapter 4). Since the canonical domain for convex risk measures
is L1 (Filipovic´ and Svindland, 2012), we assume X = Lp, p 2 [1,1] in this section. Recall that we
assume that risk measures are law-invariant throughout.
For any convex risk measure that also satisfies zero-normalization (f), it can be shown that the
induced extreme-aggregation measure is once more the smallest dominating coherent risk measure.
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Theorem 4.1. The extreme-aggregation measure induced by any convex risk measure ⇢ with ⇢(0) = 0
is the smallest coherent risk measure dominating ⇢.
More can be said when the risk measure ⇢ satisfies the Fatou property. A law-invariant risk
measure ⇢ on Lp, p 2 [1,1) satisfies the Fatou property (FP), if
(FP) Fatou: lim inf
n!1
⇢(Xn) > ⇢(X) if X,X1, X2, · · · 2 L
p, Xn
Lp
! X as n!1.
A law-invariant convex risk measure on Lp, p 2 [1,1) satisfying the Fatou property has a dual
representation (also called a robust representation in Fo¨llmer and Schied, 2011)
⇢ = sup
µ2P
⇢Z 1
0
ES↵dµ(↵)− v(µ)
}
, (4.1)
where P is the set of all probability measures on [0, 1], and v : P ! R[ {+1} is a penalty function
of ⇢. The representation (4.1) was established in Frittelli and Rosazza Gianin (2005) for convex
risk measures on L1 (in that case, the L1-Fatou property is always guaranteed on an atomless
probability space, see Jouini et al., 2006 and Section 5.1 of Delbaen, 2012); for the case of Lp see
Svindland (2009, Lemma 2.14). For such risk measures, we have the following characterization for
the extreme-aggregation measure of ⇢.
Corollary 4.2. Suppose ⇢ is a convex risk measure on Lp, p 2 [1,1] with the Fatou property and
a penalty function v in (4.1), then
Γ⇢ = sup
µ2Pv
Z 1
0
ES↵dµ(↵), (4.2)
where Pv = {µ 2 P : v(µ) < +1}.
Note that Γ⇢ in (4.2) is a coherent risk measure with the Fatou property. In particular, the
robust representation of Γ⇢ in (4.2) reflects directly the corresponding representation of ⇢ in (4.1),
dispensing with the penalty function and focusing on those probability measures that are potentially
used in the calculation of ⇢.
4.2 Extreme-aggregation measures induced by shortfall risk measures
In this section we focus on risk measures that are derived via loss functions. Here, a loss
function ` : R! R is an increasing and convex function that is not identically constant. Following
Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011), a shortfall risk measure is defined as
⌧`,x0(X) = inf{x 2 R : E(`(X − x)) 6 x0}, X 2 L
1, (4.3)
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where x0 is an interior point of the range of `. Shortfall risk measures belong to the class of convex
risk measures. Without essential loss of generality we may assume x0 = `(0) such that ⌧`,x0 satisfies
zero-normalization; in that case we write ⌧` := ⌧`,`(0).
The p-expectile, denoted by ep, is a risk measure of type (4.3) defined for x0 = 0 and the loss
function `p(x) = px+ − (1− p)x−, p 2 (0, 1), where x+ := max(x, 0) and x− := max(−x, 0), x 2 R.
Equivalently, it satisfies (Newey and Powell, 1987)
pE[(X − ep(X))+] = (1− p)E[(X − ep(X))−], X 2 L
1.
For the purposes of this paper, we extend the definition of expectiles by defining e1(X) = ess-sup(X)
and e0(X) = ess-inf(X). The p-expectile is evidently positively homogeneous. For p > 1/2 the loss
function `p is convex, such that ep is a shortfall risk measure and is also coherent (Bellini et al.,
2014). In fact, {ep, p > 1/2} is the only class of coherent shortfall risk measures (Weber, 2006) and
the only class of elicitable coherent risk measures (Delbaen et al., 2015)4.
Expectiles play a special role in the construction of extreme-aggregation measures induced by
shortfall risk measures. Since ` is convex and not always a constant, we know that a` := lim
x!1
`0+(x)
exists in (0,1], b` := lim
x!−1
`0+(x) exists in [0,1), and b` 6 a`. For each `, define the loss function
`⇤(x) = a`x+ − b`x−.
By b` 6 a`, `
⇤ is a convex loss function, derived from `, and giving rise to a coherent risk measure via
(4.3). Thus the risk measure ⌧`∗ is a coherent expectile, with ⌧`∗(X) = ep`(X) for p` = a`/(a`+b`) >
1/2.
Note the analogy with the definition of h⇤ in Section 3. Indeed, the extreme-aggregation
measure induced by a convex shortfall risk measure is an expectile.
Proposition 4.3. The extreme-aggregation measure induced by any shortfall risk measure ⌧`,x0 is
the smallest coherent expectile dominating ⌧`,x0, and is given by Γ⌧`,x0 = ⌧`∗ = ep` .
For many loss functions used in practice it may be a` =1 or b` = 0. In that case the extreme-
aggregation measure is the essential supremum. This implies that for many models used in practice
it may be Γ⌧`(X) = 1, showing that risk aggregations lead to an explosion of portfolio risk. An
example is the entropic risk measure defined in (2.1).
5 Conclusions
We examine the superadditivity properties of general classes of risk measures, corresponding
to worst-case diversification scenarios. The introduction of extreme-aggregation measures Γ⇢ allows
4See also Ziegel (2014), Bellini and Bignozzi (2014) and Kou and Peng (2014) for characterization of elicitable risk
measures.
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a systematic study of the behavior of a risk measure ⇢ “at its most superadditive” and the quan-
tification of worst-case portfolio capital requirements under dependence uncertainty. Furthermore,
extreme-aggregation measures, when coherent, allow us to construct for general risk measures their
smallest dominating coherent risk measures.
Explicit forms of extreme-aggregation measures are obtained for distortion and convex risk
measures and in both cases the induced extreme-aggregation measures are coherent. The main
theoretical results in this paper suggest that an extreme-aggregation measure inherits all key prop-
erties of a risk measure, and in addition, often “gains” positive homogeneity as well as convexity or
subadditivity.
When capital is set using a non-subadditive risk measure ⇢, whatever the motivation for this
choice, the extreme-coherence of ⇢ implies that a coherent risk measure Γ⇢ needs to be considered
in order to quantify portfolio risk under dependence uncertainty. This is further evidence in favor
of coherence (subadditivity, in particular) as a desirable property for risk measures.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. To prove (a) and (b), first we deal with the case that ⇢ is positively homogeneous (i) or
comonotonic additive (ii).
(a) From the definition of Γ⇢,n, the inequality Γ⇢,n(XF ) 6 Γ⇢,kn(XF ) is equivalent to
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Skn(F )} > k sup{⇢(R) : R 2 Sn(F )}.
Note that for all R 2 Sn(F ), we have kR 2 Skn(F ). Thus
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Skn(F )} > ⇢(kR) = k⇢(R), 8R 2 Sn(F ),
where the last equality is implied by that ⇢ is comonotonic additive or positively homogeneous.
In particular this holds for sup{⇢(R) : R 2 Sn(F )}, from which the result follows.
(b) By (a) we can see that for a fixed m 2 N we have that Γ⇢,m(XF ) 6 Γ⇢,km(XF ) for all k 2 N,
and this directly implies
sup
m2N
Γ⇢,m(XF ) 6 lim sup
n!1
Γ⇢,n(XF ). (A.1)
The opposite inequality follows immediately and thus (A.1) is an equality.
16
In the following we assume ⇢ is comonotonic additive. Let k,m, n 2 N and k =
⌅
n
m
⇧
be the
inferior integer part of n/m so that n > km. Then
Γ⇢,n(XF ) =
km
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Sn(F )}
km
>
km
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Skm(F )}+ (n− km)⇢(XF )
km
>
km
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Sm(F )}
m
+
(n− km)⇢(XF )
n
=
km
n
Γ⇢,m(XF ) +
(n− km)⇢(XF )
n
,
where in the last inequality we used part (a). It follows that for m fixed,
lim inf
n!1
Γ⇢,n(XF ) > lim
n!1
km
n
Γ⇢,m(XF ) + lim
n!1
n− km
n
⇢(XF ) = Γ⇢,m(XF ).
By taking supremum over m, we obtain
lim inf
n!1
Γ⇢,n(XF ) > sup
m2N
Γ⇢,m(XF ).
The opposite inequality follows immediately and we get
lim
n!1
Γ⇢,n(XF ) = sup
n2N
Γ⇢,n(XF ).
Now consider the case (iii) where ⇢ is convex. Then for any X1, . . . , Xn ⇠ F , it is
⇢(X1 + · · ·+Xn) = ⇢
✓
1
n
nX1 + · · ·+
1
n
nXn
◆
6
1
n
⇢(nX1) + · · ·+
1
n
⇢(nXn) = ⇢(nXF ).
Consequently
⇢(nXF ) = sup
S2Sn(F )
⇢(S) =) Γ⇢,n(XF ) =
1
n
⇢(nXF ).
By the convexity of ⇢ and the assumption ⇢(0) = 0, Γ⇢,n(XF ) is increasing in n, which implies (a)
and (b).
(c) For any n 2 N, Γ⇢,n(XF ) 6
1
n
sup{⇢+(S) : S 2 Sn(F )} 6
1
n
n⇢+(XF ) = ⇢
+(XF ).
Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. The inheritance of (a-c, f) is immediate. For subadditivity (d) let X,Y be two random
variables with distributions F and G respectively, then
Γ⇢,n(X + Y ) 6
1
n
sup{⇢(T +R) : T 2 Sn(F ), R 2 Sn(G)}
6
1
n
sup{⇢(T ) : T 2 Sn(F )}+
1
n
sup{⇢(R) : R 2 Sn(G)}
= Γ⇢,n(X) + Γ⇢,n(Y ).
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By taking an upper limit as n!1 on both sides, we obtain that Γ⇢ is subadditive. For convexity
(f) a similar argument applies. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 2.1 (a) that if ⇢ is (i) positively
homogeneous or (ii) comonotonic additive or (iii) convex and zero-normalized, then Γ⇢ > ⇢.
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Before giving the proof of Lemma 3.1, we introduce a useful lemma, which characterizes an
ordering of distortion risk measures in terms of their distortion functions. The lemma will be used
repeatedly in proofs of later results.
Lemma A.1. (a) For a distortion risk measure ⇢h and every F such that ⇢h(XF ) <1,
⇢h(XF ) =
Z 1
0
F−1(t)dh(t) = F−1(0) +
Z 1
0
(1− h(t))dF−1(t).
(b) For two distortion risk measures ⇢h1 , ⇢h2,
h1(t) 6 h2(t) for all t 2 [0, 1] , ⇢h1(XF ) > ⇢h2(XF ) for all distributions F .
Proof. (a) By integration by parts,
Z 1
0
F−1(t)dh(t) =
Z 1
0
F−1(t)d(−(1− h(t)))
= −F−1(t)(1− h(t))
∣∣1
0
+
Z 1
0
(1− h(t))dF−1(t)
= −F−1(t)(1− h(t))
∣∣
t!1−
+ F−1(0) +
Z 1
0
(1− h(t))dF−1(t).
To prove that the first term F−1(t)(1− h(t)) tends to 0 as t! 1, note that
⇢h(XF ) =
Z 1
0
F−1(t)dh(t) = E[F−1(Y )] <1, (A.2)
where Y is a random variable with probability distribution h. From (A.2) it follows that
lim
u!1−
F−1(u)P(Y > u) = 0.
Note that P(Y > u) = 1− h(u) which gives the result.
(b) It follows immediately from the definition of distortion risk measure given in (a).
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The set
Hh := {g : [0, 1]! [0, 1], g 6 h, g is increasing, and convex on [0,1]} (A.3)
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is not empty, since g(t) := 0, t 2 [0, 1] is an element of Hh. Also the supremum is finite since
everything in Hh is bounded above by h. Hence h
⇤ = sup{g 2 Hh} is a well-defined function. It is
easy to verify that h⇤ 6 h. The supremum of increasing functions is increasing, thus h⇤ is increasing.
Further, because g(0+) 6 h(0+) = 0 for any g 2 Hh, h
⇤(0+) = 0. We only need to prove that
h⇤(1−) = 1. For any ✏ > 0, let y := inf{x : h(1− x) > 1− ✏}, note that y > 0, and define
g✏(t) =
(
0 if t 2 [0, 1− y)
(t−(1−y))(1−✏)
y
if t 2 [1− y, 1],
so that g✏(1− y) = 0 and g✏(1) = 1− ✏. It is clear that g✏ 6 h, g✏ 2 Hh and g✏ 6 h
⇤ for any ✏ > 0.
In particular,
h⇤(1−) = lim
x!0+
h⇤(1− x) > sup
✏
lim
x!0+
g✏(1− x) = sup
✏
(1− ✏) = 1.
It follows that h⇤ is a distortion function. Thus from Lemma A.1 (b), ⇢h∗ > ⇢h. Since the supremum
of convex functions is still convex, h⇤ is convex and thus ⇢h∗ is coherent.
Suppose there is another coherent distortion risk measure ⇢h0 such that ⇢h 6 ⇢h0 . Always from
Lemma A.1 (b) it follows that h > h0. Hence h0 2 Hh and h0 6 h
⇤ by definition. Thus ⇢h0 > ⇢h∗ .
That is, ⇢h∗ is the smallest coherent distortion risk measure that dominates ⇢h.
Proof of Theorem 3.2
In the following we report the detailed proof of Theorem 3.2. For the ease of presentation we
slightly abuse the notation. We use ⇢h(X) = ⇢δ(X) to represent the risk measure with distortion
factor δ and distortion function h. Both are convenient at different places.
We start with the case when δ is a step function with a finite number (m) of steps. In the
following we make this assumption throughout. To be more specific, let m be a positive integer,
0 = b0 < b1 < · · · < bm = 1 be a partition of [0, 1], and a1, . . . , am be non-negative numbers, with
ai 6= ai+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1. We suppose that δ has the following form: for i = 1, . . . ,m,
δ(t) = ai, t 2 [bi−1, bi) ,
and in addition, δ(1) = am. It is obvious that for each step function δ, the values of m, {bi}
m
i=0 and
{ai}
m
i=1 are uniquely determined.
We define the incoherence index
#(δ) =
m−1X
i=1
I{ai+1<ai}.
If ai+1 < ai for some i, we say δ is incoherent at the i-th step. Suppose δ is a step function and let
K be its largest incoherent step, i.e. δ(t) = aK+1 < aK = δ(s) for t 2 [bK , bK+1), s 2 [bK−1, bK),
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and δ is increasing on [bK , 1]. Define the operator L on δ as follows: if #(δ) > 1, then
Lδ(t) =
(
δ(t) t 62 [bK−1, bK+1), t 2 [0, 1],
bK−bK−1
bK+1−bK−1
aK +
bK+1−bK
bK+1−bK−1
aK+1 t 2 [bK−1, bK+1).
Since Z bK+1
bK−1
Lδ(t)dt = (bK − bK−1)aK + (bK+1 − bK)aK+1 =
Z bK+1
bK−1
δ(t)dt,
we have that Lδ is still a distortion factor. If #(δ) = 0 (i.e. δ does not have an incoherent step; δ
is increasing), let Lδ = δ. Lemma A.1 (b) implies that ⇢Lδ > ⇢δ by noting that hLδ(t) 6 h(t).
Lemma A.2. Suppose that δ is a step function, and F has a bounded support. Then
lim
n!1
✓
sup
⇢
⇢Lδ
✓
S
n
◆
: S 2 Sn(F )
}
− sup
⇢
⇢δ
✓
S
n
◆
: S 2 Sn(F )
}◆
= 0. (A.4)
Proof. First, note that for any S 2 Sn(F ), there exists R 2 Sn(F ), R
d
= S such that R can be
written as R = X1+· · ·+Xn whereXi ⇠ F , i = 1, . . . , n, and (X1, . . . , Xn) is exchangeable. This can
be seen from the fact that Fn(F ) := {distribution function of (Y1, . . . , Yn) : Yi ⇠ F, i = 1, . . . , n} is
a convex set. Hence, for S = Y1 + · · ·+ Yn, Yi ⇠ F , i = 1, . . . , n, one can always take the average of
the distribution functions of all permutations of (Y1, . . . , Yn) to obtain an exchangeable distribution
F. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) ⇠ F then we have that Xi ⇠ F , i = 1, . . . , n and R := X1 + · · · + Xn
d
=
Y1 + . . . , Yn = S.
Denote
M = F−1(1) <1, and rn = sup
⇢
⇢Lδ
✓
S
n
◆
: S 2 Sn(F )
}
. (A.5)
Note that sup {⇢δ (S/n) : S 2 Sn(F )} 6 rn < 1 since ⇢Lδ > ⇢δ and F has bounded support. By
definition of rn, for any ✏ > 0, there exists R 2 Sn(F ) such that ⇢Lδ(R/n) > rn − ✏ and one can
write R = X1 + · · ·+Xn where Xi ⇠ F , i = 1, . . . , n, and (X1, . . . , Xn) is exchangeable. Let FR be
the distribution function of R. Define the random event
A = {R 2 [F−1R (bK−1), F
−1
R (bK+1))}. (A.6)
In the following we discuss different cases:
(a) Suppose P(A) = 0, then F−1R (bK−1) = F
−1
R (bK+1) and
⇢Lδ(R)− ⇢δ(R) =
Z 1
0
F−1R (t)(Lδ(t)− δ(t))dt
=
Z bK+1
bK−1
F−1R (t)(Lδ(t)− δ(t))dt
= F−1R (bK−1)
Z bK+1
bK−1
(Lδ(t)− δ(t))dt = 0.
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(b) Suppose P(A) > 0. Let FA be the distribution function of X1|A. Since the distribution of
(X1, . . . , Xn) is exchangeable, FA is also the distribution function of Xi|A, i = 2, . . . , n. We
can calculate the mean of FA:
E[X1|A] =
1
n
E[R|A]. (A.7)
(b1) Suppose that E[R|A] = F−1R (bK−1) or E[R|A] = F
−1
R (bK+1). Then R is a constant on A, and
⇢Lδ(R)− ⇢δ(R) = E[R|A]
Z bK+1
bK−1
(Lδ(t)− δ(t))dt = 0.
(b2) Suppose that F−1R (bK−1) < E[R|A] < F
−1
R (bK+1). Denote for i = 1, . . . , n,
Wi = Xi(1− IA) +
1
n
E[R|A]IA,
and T = W1 + · · · +Wn. Denote by FT the distribution function of T . It is easy to see that
T = R a.s. on Ac, and since we assume F−1R (bK−1) < E[R|A] < F
−1
R (bK+1), F
−1
T (t) = F
−1
R (t)
for t 62 [bK−1, bK+1).
We can check that
⇢Lδ(R)− ⇢δ(T )
=
Z 1
0
(F−1R (t)Lδ(t)− F
−1
T (t)δ(t))dt
=
Z bK+1
bK−1
(F−1R (t)Lδ(t)− F
−1
T (t)δ(t))dt
=
✓
bK − bK−1
bK+1 − bK−1
aK +
bK+1 − bK
bK+1 − bK−1
aK+1
◆Z bK+1
bK−1
F−1R (t)dt− E[R|A]
Z bK+1
bK−1
δ(t)dt
= ((bK − bK−1)aK + (bK+1 − bK)aK+1)E[R|A]− E[R|A]((bK − bK−1)aK + (bK+1 − bK)aK+1)
= 0.
To continue analyzing the case (b2), we will use the following lemma.
Lemma A.3 (Corollary 3.1 of Wang and Wang, 2015). Suppose G is any distribution. If the
support of G is contained in [a, b], a < b, a, b 2 R, then there exists T 2 Sn(G) such that
|T − E[T ]| 6 b− a.
In the following we use M given in (A.5) and A given in (A.6). Lemma A.3 tells us that there
exist random variables Y1, . . . , Yn with a common distribution FA such that
|Y1 + · · ·+ Yn − E[Y1 + · · ·+ Yn]| 6M. (A.8)
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We choose Y1, . . . , Yn such that they are independent of A (this is always possible since (A.8)
only concerns the distribution of (Y1, . . . , Yn)). Note that by (A.7), E[Y1+ · · ·+Yn] = E[R|A].
Hence
|Y1 + · · ·+ Yn − E[R|A]| 6M.
Denote for i = 1, . . . , n,
Zi = Xi(1− IA) + YiIA.
For x 2 R,
P(Zi 6 x) = P(Xi 6 x,A
c) + P(Yi 6 x,A)
= P(Xi 6 x,A
c) + P(Yi 6 x)P(A)
= P(Xi 6 x,A
c) + P(Xi 6 x|A)P(A)
= P(Xi 6 x) = F (x).
Thus, Zi ⇠ F for i = 1, . . . , n and Rˆ := Z1 + · · ·+ Zn is in Sn(F ). It is easy to see that
|Rˆ− T | = |Y1 + · · ·+ Yn − E[R|A]|IA 6M.
Finally, |⇢δ(T )−⇢δ(Rˆ)| 6M since monetary risk measures are Lipschitz continuous. It follows
that |⇢Lδ(R)− ⇢δ(Rˆ)| 6M.
We have either (a, b1), |⇢Lδ(R)−⇢δ(R)| = 0 or (b2), |⇢Lδ(R)−⇢δ(Rˆ)| 6M . Recall that ⇢Lδ(R/n) >
rn − ✏. Hence, we have that in both cases,
sup
⇢
⇢δ
✓
S
n
◆
: S 2 Sn(F )
}
> ⇢Lδ
✓
R
n
◆
−
M
n
> rn − ✏−
M
n
.
Since ✏ > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that
rn > sup
⇢
⇢δ
✓
S
n
◆
: S 2 Sn(F )
}
> rn −
M
n
,
and Lemma (A.2) follows.
Lemma A.4. Suppose that the distortion factor δ is a step function with m steps and F has a
bounded support. We have that
lim
n!1
1
n
sup {⇢δ(S) : S 2 Sn(F )} = ⇢Lmδ(XF ),
and moreover, ⇢Lmδ = ⇢
+
δ .
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Proof. Since the support of F is bounded, we have ⇢Lkδ(XF ) < 1 for all k 2 N. By applying
Lemma A.2 iteratively, we have
lim
n!1
✓
sup
⇢
⇢Lkδ
✓
S
n
◆
: S 2 Sn(F )
}
− sup
⇢
⇢δ
✓
S
n
◆
: S 2 Sn(F )
}◆
= 0
for any k 2 N. Note that the operator L : δ ! Lδ either reduces the number of steps in δ by one
(if #(δ) > 0) or Lδ = δ (if #(δ) = 0). Since the number of steps in δ is m, we have that #(δ) 6 m
and Lmδ is an increasing function. It follows that ⇢Lmδ is a coherent risk measure and hence
sup {⇢Lmδ(S) : S 2 Sn(F )} = n⇢Lmδ(XF ).
Thus,
lim
n!1
1
n
sup {⇢δ(S) : S 2 Sn(F )} = ⇢Lmδ(XF ).
Since #(Lmδ) = 0, ⇢Lmδ is a coherent distortion risk measure, ⇢Lmδ > ⇢δ, and hence ⇢Lmδ > ⇢
+ by
Lemma 3.1. In addition, ⇢Lmδ(XF ) 6 ⇢
+(XF ) for XF 2 L
1 by Proposition 2.1 (c). Thus, the two
distortion risk measures ⇢Lmδ and ⇢
+ agree on L1, and hence they agree on X .
Recall that in Lemma 3.1, for any distortion function h, its largest dominated convex distortion
function is given by h⇤ := sup{g : g 2 Hh}, where H(·) is defined in (A.3).
Lemma A.5. Let f , g and fm, m 2 N be distortion functions.
(a) If fm ! f weakly as m!1, then f
⇤
m ! f
⇤ uniformly, and |⇢+fm(X)− ⇢
+
f (X)| ! 0 as m!1
for all X 2 L1.
(b) Let ✏ > 0 be a real number. If |f − g| 6 ✏ on [0, 1], then |⇢f (X) − ⇢g(X)| 6 2✏||X||1 and
|Γ⇢f (X)− Γ⇢g(X)| 6 2✏||X||1 for all X 2 L
1.
Proof. (a) We will use the Le´vy distance between distribution functions, defined as
d(F,G) := inf{✏ > 0 : F (x− ✏)− ✏ < G(x) < F (x+ ✏) + ✏, 8x 2 R}. (A.9)
Note that the Le´vy distance metricizes the weak topology on the set of distributions on R. For
any distortion functions (treated as distribution functions on R) f and g, suppose d(f, g) < ✏.
Then for each f0 2 Hf , let g0(t) = max{0, f0(t − ✏) − ✏}. It follows that g0 is also convex and
g0 6 g, hence g0 2 Hg. Note that d(f0, g0) 6 ✏, and since f0 is arbitrary we have that d(f
⇤, g⇤) 6
✏. This shows that d(f⇤m, f
⇤) ! 0 if d(fm, f) ! 0. As f
⇤ is convex with f⇤(1−) = f⇤(1), we
have that f⇤ is continuous. Therefore, the weak convergence f⇤m ! f
⇤ is uniform; see e.g. Chow
and Teicher (2003, p.281). Recall that from Lemma A.1 (a), we have that
⇢f (XF )− ⇢g(XF ) =
Z 1
0
(g(t)− f(t))dF−1(t). (A.10)
Therefore, by the uniform convergence f⇤m ! f
⇤, we obtain that |⇢+fm(X)− ⇢
+
f (X)| ! 0.
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(b) By (A.10), we have that |⇢f (X)− ⇢g(X)| 6 2✏||X||1 for X 2 L
1. Similarly, we have that
|Γ⇢f (XF )− Γ⇢g(XF )| 6 limn!1
∣∣∣∣sup
⇢
1
n
⇢f (S) : S 2 Sn(F )
}
− sup
⇢
1
n
⇢g(S) : S 2 Sn(F )
}∣∣∣∣
6 lim
n!1
sup
⇢
1
n
|⇢f (S)− ⇢g(S)| : S 2 Sn(F )
}
6 2✏||XF ||1.
Lemma A.6. For any distortion function h and X 2 L1, we have that
Γ⇢h(X) = ⇢
+
h (X).
Proof. Let Gm denote the set of distortion functions with an m-step distortion factor. For X 2 L
1
and hm 2 Gm, we have shown in Lemmas 3.1 and A.4 that
Γ⇢hm (X) = ⇢
+
hm
(X).
For any ✏ > 0, denote
h✏(t) =
8>><
>>:
0, h(t) < ✏;
1, h(t) > 1− ✏;
h(t), otherwise.
It is obvious that h✏ is a distortion function and h✏(t) = h(t) on an interval I = [a, b), a > 0 and
b < 1, since h(0+) = 0 and h(1−) = 1. We can take two sequences of distortion functions fm 2 Gm
and gm 2 Gm, m 2 N, such that fm % h
✏ and gm & h
✏ weakly as m!1. By Lemma A.1 (b), we
have that ⇢gm 6 ⇢h✏ 6 ⇢fm and hence
⇢+gm(X) = Γ⇢gm (X) 6 Γ⇢h✏ (X) 6 Γ⇢fm (X) = ⇢
+
fm
(X). (A.11)
It follows from Lemma A.5 (a) that ⇢+fm(X)! ⇢
+
h✏(X) and ⇢
+
gm(X)! ⇢
+
h✏(X) asm!1. Therefore,
taking limits on both sides of (A.11) leads to Γ⇢h✏ (X) = ⇢
+
h✏(X). Since |h − h
✏| < ✏, we have that
by Lemma A.5 (b),
|Γ⇢h(X)− ⇢
+
h✏(X)| = |Γ⇢h(X)− Γ⇢h✏ (X)| 6 2✏||X||1. (A.12)
Note that h✏ ! h uniformly as ✏! 0. Applying Lemma A.5 (a) again, we have that ⇢+h✏(X)! ⇢
+
h (X)
as ✏! 0. Finally, we obtain Γ⇢h(X) = ⇢
+
h (X) from (A.12) by taking ✏! 0.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Lemma A.6 implies that Γ⇢h = ⇢
+
h on L
1, and recall that Γ⇢h 6 ⇢
+
h on X by
Proposition 2.1 (c). For X 2 X , let Xm, m 2 N be a sequence of random variables in L
1 such that
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Xm % X as m!1. By the monotone convergence theorem, we have that ⇢
+
h (Xm)! ⇢
+
h (X). On
the other hand, from the monotonicity of Γ⇢h we have that
⇢+h (X) = limm!1
⇢+h (Xm) = limm!1
Γ⇢h(Xm) 6 Γ⇢h(X) 6 ⇢
+
h (X).
Therefore, Γ⇢h(X) = ⇢
+
h (X) for all X 2 X .
Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. Let Gj , j = 1, . . . ,K be the K different distributions in the sequence F, K <1. Denote
Hj = {i 2 N : Fi = Gj}.
for j = 1, . . . ,K. It is obvious that
SK
j=1Hj = N. Define for j = 1, . . . ,K,
Snj = {X1 + · · ·+Xm : Xi ⇠ Gj , m = #{i 2 Hj , i 6 n}}.
Suppose that Sj 2 S
n
j , j = 1, . . . ,K. Then
PK
j=1 Sj 2 Sn(F). Vice versa, for each S 2 Sn(F), it
can be written as S =
PK
j=1 Sj where Sj 2 S
n
j for j = 1, . . . ,K. It follows that
sup
S2Sn(F)
⇢h(S) > sup
Sj2Snj , j=1,...,K
⇢h
0
@ KX
j=1
Sj
1
A . (A.13)
Note that
{Sj 2 S
n
j : j = 1, . . . ,K} ⊃ {Sj 2 S
n
j : j = 1, . . . ,K, Sj are comonotonic}. (A.14)
It follows from (A.13)-(A.14) and the comonotonic additivity of ⇢h that
sup
S2Sn(F)
⇢h(S) > sup
Sj2Snj , j=1,...,K
⇢h
0
@ KX
j=1
Sj
1
A > KX
j=1
sup
Sj2Snj
⇢h (Sj) . (A.15)
Also note that
sup
S2Sn(F)
⇢+h (S) =
KX
j=1
sup
Sj2Snj
⇢+h (Sj) , (A.16)
by the comonotonic additivity and subadditivity of ⇢+h . For each j = 1, . . . ,K, if #(Hj) = 1, by
Theorem 3.2, as n!1, we have that
supSj2Snj ⇢h(Sj)
supSj2Snj ⇢
+
h (Sj)
! 1, and sup
Sj2Snj
⇢+h (Sj)!1. (A.17)
If #(Hj) <1, then
sup
Sj2Snj
⇢h(Sj) 6 sup
Sj2Snj
⇢+h (Sj) = #(Hj)⇢
+
h (XGj ) <1,
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i.e. both supSj2Snj ⇢h(Sj) and supSj2Snj ⇢
+
h (Sj) are finite, and they do not affect the limit of (3.4) as
n!1, since the denominator of (3.4) goes to infinity by (A.17). In summary, by (A.15)-(A.17),
1 >
supS2Sn(F) ⇢h(S)
supS2Sn(F) ⇢
+
h (S)
>
PK
j=1 supSj2Snj ⇢h (Sj)PK
j=1 supSj2Snj ⇢
+
h (Sj)
! 1.
As a consequence,
supS2Sn(F) ⇢h(S)
supS2Sn(F) ⇢
+
h (S)
! 1. (A.18)
This shows that the theorem holds for any distortion risk measure ⇢h.
Now, consider the case for ⇢GA. Since A is a finite set, by (A.18), we have that
supS2Sn(F) ⇢
G
A(S)
supS2Sn(F) ⇢
+
A(S)
=
supS2Sn(F)maxh2A ⇢h(S)
supS2Sn(F)maxh2A ⇢
+
h (S)
> min
h2A
(
supS2Sn(F) ⇢h(S)
supS2Sn(F) ⇢
+
h (S)
)
! 1. (A.19)
Proof of Theorem 4.1
By Corollary 2.3, it suffices to show that Γ⇢ is coherent. This is implied immediately by the
following lemma.
Lemma A.7. For any risk measure ⇢, the following hold:
(a) Γ⇢(0) = 0.
(b) For k 2 N, Γ⇢(kXF ) 6 kΓ⇢(XF ).
(c) If ⇢ is convex, then Γ⇢ is subadditive and positive homogeneous.
Proof. (a) Recall that |⇢(0)| <1 is assumed throughout. Then Γ⇢(0) = lim supn!1
1
n
⇢(0) = 0.
(b) Denote by Fk the distribution of XFk := kXF . It is obvious that XFk 2 Sk(F ) by taking
X1 = · · · = Xk = XF . As a consequence, Sn(Fk) ⇢ Skn(F ) since each element in Sn(Fk) can
be written as an element in Skn(F ). It follows that
Γ⇢(kXF ) = lim sup
n!1
1
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Sn(Fk)}
6 lim sup
n!1
1
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Skn(F )}
= k lim sup
n!1
1
kn
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Skn(F )}
6 k lim sup
n!1
1
n
sup{⇢(S) : S 2 Sn(F )} = kΓ⇢(XF ).
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(c) By Proposition 2.2, Γ⇢ is convex if ⇢ is convex. For any X,Y 2 X , using (b),
Γ⇢(X + Y ) 6 2Γ⇢
✓
1
2
X +
1
2
Y
◆
6 2
✓
1
2
Γ⇢(X) +
1
2
Γ⇢(Y )
◆
= Γ⇢(X) + Γ⇢(Y ).
Thus we have the subadditivity. The positive homogeneity is implied by subadditivity, convexity
and zero-normalization, via Deprez and Gerber (1985, Theorem 2).
Proof of Corollary 4.2
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume ⇢(0) = 0; otherwise one can work with the convex
risk measure ⇢ˆ = ⇢ − ⇢(0), and easily check that Γ⇢ = Γ⇢ˆ since Γ⇢,n − Γ⇢ˆ,n =
1
n
⇢(0) ! 0. As a
consequence, v > 0 on P. Note that by Proposition 2.1 and the fact that a convex risk measure
with the Fatou property preserves convex order, we have that for each distribution F , the worst
dependence structure is the comonotonic one X1 = . . . = Xn = XF , hence
Γ⇢(XF ) = sup
n2N
1
n
sup
µ2P
⇢Z 1
0
ES↵(nXF )dµ(↵)− v(µ)
}
= sup
µ2P
⇢Z 1
0
ES↵(XF )dµ(↵)− inf
n2N
1
n
v(µ)
}
= sup
µ2Pv
⇢Z 1
0
ES↵(XF )dµ(↵)
}
,
where the second equality is obtained exchanging the two suprema.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. First assume 0 < b` 6 a` < 1. The case when b` = 0 or a` = 1 will be commented on at
the end of the proof. Without loss of generality we can assume `(0) = x0 = 0. Note that
sup{inf{x 2 R : E[`(S − x)] 6 0)} : S 2 Sn(F )}
= inf{x 2 R : E[`(S − x)] 6 0, for all S 2 Sn(F )}
= inf{x 2 R : sup{E[`(S − x)] : S 2 Sn(F )} 6 0}.
We have, by the convexity of `, that
sup{E[`(S − x)] : S 2 Sn(F )} = E[`(nXF − x)].
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It follows that
Γ⌧S
`
(XF ) = lim sup
n!1
1
n
sup{inf{x 2 R : E[`(S − x)] 6 0)} : S 2 Sn(F )}
= lim sup
n!1
1
n
inf{x 2 R : E[`(nXF − x)] 6 0}
= lim sup
n!1
inf{t 2 R : E[`(nXF − nt)] 6 0}.
Let t⇤n =
1
n
⌧S` (nXF ) be the unique solution to E[`(nXF − nt)] = 0 (the existence of t
⇤
n is implied by
the convexity of `). It follows that
1
n
E[`(nXF − nt
⇤
n)] =
1
n
E[`(n(XF − t
⇤
n))I{XF>t∗n}] +
1
n
E[`(n(XF − t
⇤
n))I{XF6t∗n}] = 0. (A.20)
Let t0 = lim sup
n!1
t⇤n and t1 = lim inf
n!1
t⇤n. Note that `(nx)/n 6 a`x for all x > 0. We have that
lim sup
n!1
1
n
E[`(n(XF − t
⇤
n))I{XF>t∗n}] 6 lim sup
n!1
E[a`(XF − t
⇤
n)+] = a`E[(XF − t1)+].
Let {t⇤nk} be a subsequence of {t
⇤
n} which converges to t1. Since
1
nk
E[(`(nkXF − t
⇤
nk
))+] 6 a`E[(XF − t
⇤
nk
)+] = a`E[(XF − t1 + o(1))+] <1,
by dominated convergence theorem, we have that
lim
k!1
1
nk
E[`(nk(XF − t
⇤
nk
))I{XF>t∗nk}
] = E

lim
k!1
1
nk
`(nk(XF − t
⇤
nk
))I{XF>t∗nk}
]
= E[a`(XF − t1)+].
In summary, we have that
lim sup
n!1
1
n
E[`(n(XF − t
⇤
n))I{XF>t∗n}] = a`E[(XF − t1)+],
and similarly we obtain that
lim sup
n!1
1
n
E[`(n(XF − t
⇤
n))I{XF6t∗n}] = −b`E[(t0 −XF )+].
It follows from (A.20) that
a`E[(XF − t1)+] = b`E[(t0 −XF )+]. (A.21)
Similarly, we have
lim inf
n!1
1
n
E[`(n(XF − t
⇤
n))I{XF>t∗n}] = a`E[(XF − t0)+],
and
lim inf
n!1
1
n
E[`(n(XF − t
⇤
n))I{XF6t∗n}] = −b`E[(t1 −XF )+].
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Again, it follows from (A.20) that
a`E[(XF − t0)+] = b`E[(t1 −XF )+]. (A.22)
(A.21)-(A.22) imply that t0 = t1 and t
⇤ := lim
n!1
t⇤n is the unique solution to
a`E[(XF − t
⇤)+] = b`E[(t
⇤ −XF )+].
When b` = 0 or a` = 1, (A.20) implies that lim sup
n!1
E[`(XF − t
⇤
n)I{XF>t∗n}] = 0. In this case,
t⇤ = ess-sup(XF ).
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